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623 
The Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social 
Meaning 
William C. Duncan∗ 
“The life of reason is our heritage and exists only  
through tradition. Now the misfortune of revolutionists is  
that they are disinherited, and their folly is that they wish to be  
disinherited even more than they are.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, few litigation strategies have evoked 
more comment, political turmoil, constitutional change, and legal 
commentary as the effort to redefine marriage to include same-sex 
couples. Nearly a dozen cases have been decided and more are now 
pending. Two successful cases have led to state constitutional 
amendments2 and the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.3 
This article will describe the early same-sex marriage litigation, then 
turn to the cases from the 1990’s before describing current same-sex 
marriage litigation. I have assigned some cases to categories that are not 
chronologically accurate because the context of the case makes them 
more like cases from a previous era. Of course, the assignment may be 
somewhat arbitrary.4 
 
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium” 
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young 
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School, or Brigham Young University. 
∗ Executive Director, Marriage and Family Law Research Grant, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University. 
 1. JOHN BUCHAN, MEMORY HOLD-THE-DOOR 202 (1940) (quoting George Santayana). 
 2. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (see Kevin G. Clarkson, William C. Duncan & David Orgon 
Coolidge, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA 
L. REV. 213 (1999)); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage 
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Constitutionality, 22 HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000)). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) codified as1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (1997. 
 4. For instance, the Alaska case discussed in Part III bears a resemblance to the cases of the 
1970s in posture. I have included it in its chronological context because of its outcome. 
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The article will then make some observations about the changing 
nature of the litigation in an attempt to explain the shift in success 
between the first and second wave of cases attempting to redefine 
marriage. Finally, it will speculate on the future of claims for same-sex 
marriage: how they might arise and what they might bode for the social 
meaning of marriage. 
II.  LONG SHOT: 1970S AND 1980S 
Until the mid-1990s same-sex marriage litigation was always 
something of a long shot. The first few cases illustrate the difficulty 
plaintiffs had in convincing the courts to adopt their novel reasoning. 
A.  Minnesota 
The first case in which a same-sex couple sought to compel a state to 
grant them a marriage license began in Minnesota in 1970 when Jack 
Baker and Michael McConnell filed suit.5 Both men saw their lawsuit as 
part of a broader challenge to marriage and its place in the culture.6 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in the case flatly rejected their 
contentions. It first held that the State’s marriage statute could not be 
construed to permit same-sex marriage since marriage is inherently 
opposite-sex as evidenced by the dictionary definition of the term and the 
use of gender specific terms in the family statutes.7 The court also 
rejected plaintiffs’ due process claim on the basis of history, saying the 
due process clause was not a charter for judicial legislation.8 They 
distinguished Griswold v. Connecticut9  because that case assumed the 
opposite-sex nature of marriage and dealt only with rights within 
marriage.10 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ analogy to sterile couples 
because the majority felt a fertility requirement would violate privacy 
and because the distinction between same- and opposite-sex couples in 
regards to procreative potential is largely accurate despite some 
exceptions among opposite-sex couples.11 In regards to the plaintiffs’ 
equal protection claim, the court rejected their proffered analogy to 
 
 5. Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 
15, 20 (2000). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1972), dismissed for lack of substantial 
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1973). 
 8. Id. at 186. 
 9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 10. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
 11. Id. at 187. 
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Loving v. Virginia,12 noting that this precedent related to race while the 
relevant category in this case was sex, a fundamentally different 
category.13 
Although not widely recognized, this case also created U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent on the same-sex marriage issue. The plaintiffs appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court in February 1972.14 The American Civil 
Liberties Union declined to take the case, believing it might harm other 
efforts, so the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union pursued the appeal 
arguing that Minnesota’s marriage law constituted sex discrimination.15 
When the Court rejected plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, they 
unanimously did so on the grounds that the case failed to raise a 
substantial federal question.16 The Court has expressly noted that such a 
decision is a ruling on the merits of the case.17 Thus, unless the Court 
reconsiders, there is binding precedent to the effect that the U.S. 
Constitution creates no right to redefine marriage to include same-sex 
couples. It is also interesting to note that this decision came just six years 
after the Supreme Court’s right to marry decision in Loving v. Virginia18 
and despite an invitation from the plaintiffs to hold that Loving applied.19 
B.  Washington 
The next same-sex marriage case arose in Seattle, Washington and 
involved another male couple, also associated with a broader cultural 
agenda.20 Their effort was also unsuccessful. The Washington Court of 
Appeals, relying on gender specific language in the marriage-related 
statutes, rejected plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation claim.21 An important 
aspect of the court’s decision was its response to the plaintiffs’ claim that 
marriage is a form of sex discrimination. First, the court held that the 
state Equal Rights Amendment was not intended to redefine marriage, 
rather its purpose was to protect women, not promote same-sex 
marriage.22 It asserted that plaintiffs are unable to marry because of the 
 
 12. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 13. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 14. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE 
SUPREME COURT 167 (2001). 
 15. Id. at 168-69. 
 16. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1973). See also MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 
171. 
 17. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). 
 18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 19. See Baker v. Nelson, Jurisdictional Statement at 14-17 (Feb. 11, 1973). 
 20. Johnson, supra note 5 at 22. 
 21. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 
1008 (1974). 
 22. Id. at 1191, 1194. 
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definition of marriage, not their sex.23 It specified that the Equal Rights 
Amendment allows both sexes to access existing rights, it does not create 
new rights.24 Finally, the court held that a law based on physical 
differences is an exception even to the absolutist reading of the Equal 
Rights Amendment.25 Since the State’s interest in marriage stems from 
the value of propagation of humanity and same-sex couples are 
absolutely unable to have children, the marriage law would fit the 
physical difference exception to the Equal Rights Amendment.26 The 
court also specified that the marriage law was to be reviewed under a 
rational basis standard.27 It identified the close relationship between 
marriage and the State’s interest in protecting the environment in which 
children are raised as a rational basis supporting the law.28 The 
Washington court also rejected the analogy to Loving saying Loving was 
about race and did not involve a fundamental change in the nature of 
marriage.29 Given all this, the court felt justified in deferring to the 
legislature on the matter of changing the State’s definition of marriage.30 
C.  Kentucky 
The first marriage case to involve a female couple arose in 
Kentucky. The very brief decision arising from the controversy tracked 
the other opinions by holding that, based on the historical nature of 
marriage as well as its dictionary definition, same-sex couples are by 
definition precluded from marriage.31 The court noted that while 
marriage has changed over time, the sex requirement has been constant.32 
Thus, the law recognizes but does not create the intrinsic nature of 
marriage.33 The court rejected plaintiffs’ novel religious freedom claim 
holding that a religious ceremony cannot trump state law.34 On another 
novel claim, the court held that failure to issue a license was not a form 
of punishment for purposes of the Eight Amendment.35 
 
 23. Id. at 1192. 
 24. Id. at 1194. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1195. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1197. 
 29. Id. at 1192 n.8. 
 30. Id. at 1196 n.12. 
 31. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 590. 
 35. Id. 
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D.  Colorado 
After the initial set of cases from the early 1970s, state courts were 
silent for awhile. Then an immigration controversy brought the issue 
squarely into the federal courts for the first time. In this case a same-sex 
couple sought to have a religious commitment ceremony recognized as 
marriage in order to gain preferential immigration status.36 Following a 
marriage entered into solely to gain immigration status and its 
annulment, an Australian citizen and his U.S. citizen same-sex partner 
were “married” in a religious ceremony in Colorado where the county 
clerk had issued them a marriage license.37 The State Attorney General 
quickly declared the marriage invalid.38 When the couple returned to Los 
Angeles, the INS began deportation proceedings for the Australian Tony 
Sullivan.39 The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Mr. Sullivan’s 
claim to be married to a U.S. citizen.40 The couple, represented by David 
M. Brown (an attorney in the California “palimony” case Marvin v. 
Marvin41), then sued in federal court, but their claim was rejected at the 
trial court level.42 On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that, 
relying on the Colorado Attorney General opinion and sex-specific 
language in the statutes, Colorado’s statutory definition of marriage 
precluded marriage by same-sex couples.43 In addition, relying on 
historical analysis and the link between marriage and procreation, they 
held that a marriage between persons of the same sex would violate 
federal public policy.44 The court further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that 
they were “putative spouses” because they could not have a good faith 
belief in the validity of their marriage (i.e. all are on notice of invalidity 
of such a marriage).45 The court relied on the rejection of the Baker v. 
Nelson case by the U.S. Supreme Court for the proposition that the 
constitutional questions are insubstantial.46 The court relied on the 
intrinsically opposite-sex nature of marriage as further evidence that 
there is no constitutional violation.47 They noted that the justification of 
 
 36. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). 
 37. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 220. 
 38. Id. at 220-21. 
 39. Id. at 221. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 42. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 14, at 221. 
 43. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 1122 
(1982). 
 44. Id. at 1123. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1124. 
 47. Id. 
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state recognition of marriage is procreation and, although that interest 
may be overinclusive (meaning opposite-sex couples without the ability 
or intent to have children are still allowed to marry), it needed to be so to 
avoid privacy concerns (such as in examining a potential bride for 
fertility).48 The court concluded that the opposite-sex definition of 
marriage is the “least intrusive alternative available to protect the 
procreative relationship”49 and that recognition of homosexuals in 
discrimination laws or even legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
does not raise same-sex unions to the level of a marriage. 
E.  Pennsylvania 
In an atypical case, a same-sex couple in Pennsylvania sought a 
divorce, claiming they had established a common-law marriage.50 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the nature of common-law 
marriage is determined by reference to statutory marriage and 
Pennsylvania law uses sex-specific terms, thus indicating the opposite-
sex nature of marriage.51 The court also reasoned that the law’s disfavor 
of common-law marriages argues against expanding it to include same-
sex couples.52 The court said that the decision to expand the definition of 
marriage is the legislature’s.53 No constitutional issues were heard in the 
appeal because they had not been raised below.54 
F.  District of Columbia 
In late 1990, two men sued after being denied a marriage license 
from the clerk of the District of Columbia Superior Court.55 The D.C. 
Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in a decision producing 
three separate opinions. The majority opinion by Judge Ferren dismissed 
the claim that the marriage statute allowed for same-sex marriage, based 
on (1) the fact that the D.C. Council had rejected a bill to allow same-sex 
marriage, (2) gender-specific statutory language, (3) the traditional 
understanding of marriage and (4) other state decisions.56 Judge Ferren 
also held that the sex discrimination law of the District did not intend to 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1125. 
 50. DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984). 
 51. Id. at 954. 
 52. Id. at 955. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 956. 
 55. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (App. D.C. 1995). 
 56. Id. at 310. 
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redefine marriage and would have mentioned its intent to do if it had.57 
The court held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage 
because it is not deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the 
country.58 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s discussion of 
the right to marry had linked the right to procreation, which the court 
took as indicating that the right would not include same-sex couples.59 
The majority opinion concluded that the state interest in child bearing 
provided a rational basis for marriage law.60 
Judge Terry concurred in the decision, arguing that the inherent 
nature of marriage makes same-sex marriage an impossibility.61 He also 
argued that the court could not order a redefinition of marriage because 
to do so would violate the principle of separation of powers.62 
In another concurrence, Judge Steadman took issue with the 
discrimination claims of the plaintiffs. He said that marriage laws are not 
motivated by purposeful intent to discriminate against homosexuals.63 
Because the law applied equally to men and women, he thought it 
appropriate to reject the sex discrimination claim.64 He did not think an 
examination of the claim for suspect class status based on sexual 
orientation was necessary because even if the statute applied unequally to 
homosexuals (and homosexuals were a suspect class), the absence of a 
right to same-sex marriage prevented an equal protection problem.65 To 
bolster this claim, he reasoned that if sodomy can be criminalized, a 
relationship based on it cannot rise to the level of a constitutional right.66 
In the portion of his opinion dissenting from the court’s disposition 
of the case, Judge Ferren argued that public moral disapproval of 
homosexuality was not enough to justify the law.67 He would have 
required the state to show concrete harm (preferably in statistics) to 
establish a substantial or compelling interest.68 Thus, he felt a remand 
was needed for a trial on the level of scrutiny and compelling interest 
(including whether homosexuality is immutable).69 He believed that the 
 
 57. Id. at 316, 320. 
 58. Id. at 331. 
 59. Id. at 333. 
 60. Id. at 337. 
 61. Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 362. 
 63. Id. at 362-63. 
 64. Id. at 363. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 363 n.5. 
 67. Id. at 355. 
 68. Id. at 356. 
 69. Id. at 358. 
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argument that marriage is inherently homosexual was just like arguments 
supporting anti-miscegenation laws because same-sex couples want to 
marry for the same reasons opposite-sex couples do.70 He further argued 
that the marriage law was not just disparate in its impact, it excludes all 
couples in the affected class and that laws can be discriminatory without 
a discriminatory intent.71 
III.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:1990S TO THE PRESENT 
Professor Greg Johnson suggests that the second wave of same-sex 
marriage lawsuits differed from the first in its more narrow focus on 
securing marriage licenses rather than advancing broad cultural aims.72 
This second group of cases was certainly more strategic. Most 
importantly, these cases were more successful. 
A.  Hawaii 
The breakthrough case for putting the definition of marriage on the 
national stage, initiated just after the Dean litigation, arose in Hawaii. In 
1990, after failing to gain the support of national groups, local activist 
Bill Woods recruited three same-sex couples to challenge Hawaii’s 
marriage law.73 The trial court dismissed the case in 1991.74 The Hawaii 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the case in 1993.75 The case 
produced three opinions. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Moon 
and Justice Levinson sharply diverged from previous decisions on the 
subject. While they held that the fundamental right to marriage 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court only applies to opposite-sex 
marriage and that same-sex marriage was not rooted in the traditions of 
the constitution, the matter did not end there.76 Like previous decisions, 
the court held that the statutory language could not be understood to 
allow same-sex marriage (relying on sex-specific statutory language).77 
The court also held that there was no fundamental right to marriage 
under Hawaii’s due process clause.78 
 
 70. Id. at 359. 
 71. Id. at 359-60. 
 72. Johnson, supra note 5, at 22. 
 73. David Orgon Coolidge, In Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ Fight, Courts Try an End Run, NAT’L 
CATH. REG. 1 (Feb. 7-13, 1999). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 76. Id. at 56-57. 
 77. Id. at 60. 
 78. Id. at 57. 
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The divergence began with the court’s treatment of the equal 
protection claims of the plaintiffs. The court approached these on the 
premise that marriage is a state-created status.79 The court then ruled that 
the marriage law employed a sex classification on its face.80 The court 
further held that marriage is a sex-based classification because it takes 
into account the sex of one of the parties.81 Since, as the court held, sex-
based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under the State Equal 
Rights Amendment, the marriage statute was thus presumed 
unconstitutional unless the State was able to show a compelling interest 
in the law.82 The court rejected the State’s argument that the dual-sex 
nature of marriage is intrinsic to its definition as circular.83 The court also 
rejected the State’s proffered interest in procreation as a justification for 
the law by saying that impotent persons may marry.84 The court 
distinguished the Pennsylvania DeSanto case because it involved 
common-law marriage.85 It rejected Baker v. Nelson because that case 
involved federal constitutional claims.86 Perhaps, most importantly, it 
rejected the holdings in Jones v. Hallahan and Singer v. Hara by analogy 
to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia in which the 
trial court had suggested that interracial marriages were an 
impossibility.87 Relying on this analogy, suggested in an amicus brief 
before the court filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
the court finally rejected the State’s defense that the law applied equally 
to both men and women.88 
Judge Burns concurred in the court’s judgment but also suggested 
that there was a question of fact as to whether homosexuality constitutes 
a discrete sex.89 The dissenters, Judge Heen and Justice Hayashi, agreed 
with the plurality that the right to marry does not mean a right to same-
sex marriage.90 However, they rejected the equal protection claim 
because they believed the marriage law did not discriminate because it 
treats both sexes the same.91 They also believed the marriage law was 
 
 79. Id. at 58. 
 80. Id. at 60. 
 81. Id. at 64. 
 82. Id. at 67. 
 83. Id. at 61. 
 84. Id. at 49 n.1. 
 85. Id. at 61. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 63. 
 88. Id. at 67; see David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and 
the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 206 (1998). 
 89. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69-70. 
 90. Id. at 71. 
 91. Id. 
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justified by the State’s rational basis in encouraging procreation.92 
Finally, the dissenters said that redress for plaintiffs claim should come 
from the legislature, not the court.93 
The case thus went back to the circuit court level where the State 
would be required to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality by 
demonstrating a compelling interest in the current definition of marriage. 
At this point, Evan Wolfson of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund became co-counsel in the case.94 The trial began September 10, 
1996 and lasted two weeks.95 The trial consisted of “dueling social-
science experts” attempting to either establish or rebut the one ground on 
which the State chose to make its defense: the possibility of harm to 
children if marriage were redefined to include same-sex couples.96 At 
one point, the trial devolved into attacks on the credentials of State 
witnesses based on their personal religious beliefs.97 
Judge Chang issued his opinion on December 3, 1996.98 The opinion 
made a number of findings including that a father and mother are not 
essential to a child’s healthy development, that homosexual parents can 
raise healthy children, and that the State had demonstrated no causal link 
between same-sex marriage and negative outcomes for children.99 In fact, 
the court believed children would be assisted by same-sex marriage since 
it allows same-sex couples with children to access marital benefits.100 
Judge Chang said that same-sex couples want to marry for the same 
kinds of reasons as opposite-sex couples and that same-sex marriage will 
not harm any government interest.101 The conclusion was clear: Hawaii’s 
marriage statute was unconstitutional.102 
The State immediately appealed, and before the Hawaii Supreme 
Court could address the lower court’s opinion, the Hawaii Legislature 
proposed and the people of Hawaii approved (by a 69-31 margin) a state 
 
 92. Id. at 73. 
 93. Id. at 74. 
 94. Coolidge, supra note 88, at 206 n.14. 
 95. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of 
Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997). 
 96. David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage: As Hawaii Goes . . ., FIRST THINGS 33 (Apr. 
1997). 
 97. David Orgon Coolidge, Marriage on Trial: Leaving it to the Experts, HAW. CATH. 
HERALD 1 (Sept. 20, 1996). 
 98. Baehr v. Miike, Docket No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
 99. Id. at 17. 
 100. Id. at 18. 
 101. Id. at 18, 21. 
 102. Id. at 22. 
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constitutional amendment reserving to the legislature the power to define 
marriage.103 
B.  Alaska 
In 1995, Jay Brause and Gene Dugan owners of the Out North 
Contemporary Art House and long-time “political activists” filed suit 
challenging Alaska’s marriage law.104 Anchorage Superior Court Judge 
Peter Michalski issued an opinion in 1998 that was startlingly 
sympathetic to the arguments.105 The court held that it could not just 
accept the traditional understanding of marriage.106 The court then 
broadly construed the State constitution’s right to privacy to include the 
fundamental right to choose one’s life partner.107 For the court, the 
individual’s decision was the fundamental unit of analysis and the denial 
of that right mandated strict scrutiny.108 Almost as an afterthought, the 
court accepted the argument that marriage is a sex-based classification 
which invokes intermediate scrutiny, although this was moot since a 
fundamental privacy right was already found.109 Thus, Judge Michalski 
ordered a trial to be held to determine if the State has a compelling 
interest justifying its marriage law.110 Before the trial took place, the 
legislature proposed and an overwhelming majority of Alaskans 
approved a state constitutional amendment defining marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman.111 
C.  Vermont 
Professor Greg Johnson has noted that significant legal gains by 
same-sex couples preceded the high profile litigation in Vermont, 
including the appointment of gay and lesbian “co-liaisons” to the 
governor in 1986, the enactment of a “hate crimes” law in 1990, and the 
inclusion of “sexual orientation” as a discrete category in the state’s anti-
discrimination law in 1992.112 The Vermont Freedom to Marry Task 
Force was founded in 1995 and public relations work began before the 
 
 103. Coolidge, supra note 73. 
 104. Johnson, supra note 5, at 22-23. 
 105. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, Docket No. 3AN-95-6562 CI 1998 WL 88743 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Id. at 4. 
 108. Id. at 6. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 2. 
 111. See Clarkson, Duncan & Coolidge, supra note 2. 
 112. Johnson, supra note 5, at 28. 
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case on behalf of three same-sex couples was actually filed in July 
1997.113 In December 1997, this case was dismissed on a motion by the 
State, and plaintiffs appealed.114 During the long wait for the supreme 
court’s opinion, the work of the Task Force seemed to pay off when the 
Governor’s Commission on Women gave an award to the plaintiffs in the 
case for their “courage” in pursuing the litigation.115 This provoked a 
minor disturbance, though, when a group opposed to the redefinition of 
marriage pointed out that one of the Commission members was married 
to a Vermont Supreme Court justice before whom the case was 
pending.116 
Not long before Christmas 1999, the court finally issued its closely 
watched opinion.117 All of the justices concurred in the result that the 
State’s marriage law was constitutionally infirm, but with a significant 
twist. The majority opinion first dismissed religious and moral issues as 
irrelevant.118 They then joined the unanimous opinion among courts 
addressing the issue, holding that the statutory definition of marriage 
requires a man and a woman (relying on the dictionary definition, 
common law, and other statutory language).119 The state constitutional 
analysis, however, was significantly different from anything that had 
come before. The majority first said that the appropriate constitutional 
analysis under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution 
is based on principle of “inclusion.”120 Thus, according to the majority, if 
a statute is not “inclusive,” the State must show it is “reasonably 
necessary” to advance a state objective.121 Before looking at the 
objectives of the statute, the majority summarily dismissed the sex 
discrimination argument, holding that the marriage statute was neutral as 
to sex and that the purpose of marriage law was not to disadvantage one 
sex.122 
The majority dismissed the asserted state interest in maintaining the 
link between procreation and child rearing, calling it underinclusive 
because some married couples cannot have children and some same-sex 
 
 113. Id. at 29-30. 
 114. Id. at 30-31. 
 115. Id. at 33. 
 116. See Nancy Remsen, Justice Dooley Challenged, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS 1 (Sept. 21, 
1999). 
 117. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 118. Id. at 867. 
 119. Id. at 868. 
 120. Id. at 878. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 880 n.13. 
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couples do.123 The majority further held that the link between procreation 
and child rearing had already been severed by the existence of artificial 
reproductive technology.124 The majority said that the link between 
procreation and child rearing does not advance a substantial interest 
because same-sex and married couples are the same in regards to rearing 
children.125 Also, since Vermont already allowed same-sex couples to 
adopt, state policy doesn’t really favor child-rearing by married 
couples.126 
The majority also dismissed some of the State’s other justifications 
for its marriage law.127 They held that existing differences in Vermont 
marriage law from that of other states defeated the claim that Vermont 
had an interest in consistency with other states.128 They also held that 
Vermont’s sexual orientation discrimination law, adoption law, and other 
similar statutes undermine the State’s claim that its public policy 
disfavors the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.129 
The majority had noted that the benefits of marriage are so great that 
only a substantial interest could justify the exclusion of same-sex couples 
and having dismissed all justifications held that the Vermont constitution 
requires benefits of marriage to be extended to same-sex couples.130 The 
majority did not, however, order the State to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples. In fact, they held that the legislature can decide 
whether to redefine marriage or create a substantially similar option for 
same-sex couples.131 Lest the majority be accused of deferring to the 
legislature though, the court specified that if the legislature did not 
provide the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, the court would 
retain jurisdiction and order the issuance of marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.132 
In concurring, Justice Dooley accused the court of making a decision 
without any principled basis.133 He noted that all previous Vermont case 
law had at least applied federal constitutional analysis.134 Thus, he felt 
that the court’s approach allowed too much judicial discretion so that the 
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judges were acting like legislators.135 Justice Dooley would however, not 
have followed federal precedent because he believed Vermont’s legal 
climate was more favorable to homosexuals than the federal climate.136 
Instead, he would have followed the analysis of an Oregon Court of 
Appeals decision and held that homosexual persons constitute a suspect 
class.137 Thus, he believed that although marriage statutes are facially 
neutral, they have a disparate impact based on sexual orientation and 
would be unconstitutional.138 
The court’s attempt to draw a “compromise” position drew a strong 
dissent from Justice Johnson who believed that the court’s remedy 
involves the court too much in the legislative process and does not 
decrease uncertainty for plaintiffs.139 She would have ordered marriage 
licenses for the plaintiffs.140 Her rationale was that denying marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples is sex discrimination since the sex of one 
party is taken into account.141 Further, she believed same-sex marriage is 
a logical extension of the state public policy enacted in Vermont’s sexual 
orientation discrimination law.142 
In response to the court’s mandate, the Vermont Legislature created 
a new status called “civil unions,” which allowed same-sex couples to 
take advantage of all of the benefits of marriage under another name.143 
D.  Massachusetts 
In April 2001, seven same-sex couples represented by the co-counsel 
in the Vermont case, filed suit in the Suffolk County Superior Court 
making the familiar claims for marriage licenses.144 The plaintiffs 
however, made clear that they did not want to obtain some kind of civil 
union status as in Vermont.145 On a motion for summary judgment, the 
judge concurred with previous decisions in holding that the word 
marriage in Massachusetts statutes refers to the union of a man and a 
woman, as evidenced by the use of gender specific terms in the statute 
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and the history of the marriage institution.146 Relying on separation of 
powers principles the court held that it was required to defer to the state 
marriage statute unless the plaintiff can show there is no conceivable 
grounds to support its validity.147 The court did find such a ground: 
“Recognizing that procreation is marriage’s central purpose, it is rational 
for the Legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples who, 
theoretically, are capable of procreation.”148 The court summarily 
dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that the marriage law violated the state Equal 
Rights Amendment because the Amendment does not apply to 
discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation.”149 Further, the court 
noted that Massachusetts had no provision analogous to Vermont’s 
common benefits clause that would support a finding that the marriage 
statute is unconstitutional and that Article 6 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution is only violated if a statute’s purpose is to confer special 
privileges on a particular group.150 Most of the opinion focused on the 
question of a due process right to same-sex marriage. The court held that 
the Massachusetts constitution recognizes only rights “deeply rooted in 
the Commonwealth’s history and tradition” as fundamental and the 
definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is “deeply 
rooted in our Commonwealth’s legal tradition and practice.”151 Plaintiffs’ 
novel claims for marriage licenses based on rights of speech and 
association were also rejected.152 Given all this, the court concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ request should properly be directed to the legislature, not 
the courts.153 
The plaintiffs appealed and oral argument was held in the Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) in March 2003.154 The SJC handed down its 
decision on November 17, 2003 and what it lacked in promptness it 
made up in novelty.155 The SJC framed the question raised in the debate 
as “whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations 
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish 
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to marry.”156 The succinct answer of four of the court’s seven judges 
was: “We conclude that it may not.”157 In its opinion, the majority noted 
the deep cultural divisions surrounding the proposal to redefine marriage 
to include same-sex couples.158 It cavalierly swept these aside though, 
quoting Lawrence v. Texas to assure the people of Massachusetts that it 
was “defin[ing] the liberty of all, not . . . mandat[ing] our own moral 
code.”159 In the first section of the opinion, the court went to great length 
to portray the plaintiffs in a most positive light even including the 
improbable statement that some of the same-sex couples lived with 
“their” children, conveniently ignoring the reality that these children 
somewhere have at least one other parent not mentioned in this case 
(unless procreative technology has taken a leap of which all of us have 
been unaware).160 The court then turned to the claim that since 
Massachusetts law has not included a specific statutory definition of 
marriage it could already include same-sex couples.161 Like all of the 
previous decisions from other states, the court rejected this claim.162 
The decision goes to some effort in multiple places to assure us that 
their opinion is based on the provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution so as to avoid any possibility of review by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.163 The opinion, however, cites liberally from asides in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions which are treated as a sort of Bartlett’s 
Quotations, providing support for the most free-ranging of the court’s 
conclusions (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Griswold v. Connecticut, 
Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas, Romer v. Evans and even the interracial 
adoption case Palmore v. Sidoti).164 In its constitutional analysis the court 
specifically rejected any role for the history of marriage as a social 
institution.165 Instead, the court portrays “civil marriage” as a “wholly 
secular institution” created by the government.166 To further stigmatize 
historical precedent, the court rolls out the anti-miscegenation analogy 
(some believe marriage has a social meaning that precludes its gender-
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neutral redefinition but they used to say the same thing about interracial 
marriages).167 
The court’s constitutional analysis is somewhat difficult to pin down. 
The opinion says it is assessing the law against constitutional guarantees 
of both individual liberty and equality but does not separate out the 
two.168 The court specifically claims to be employing the very deferential 
“rational basis” test for determining the law’s validity but gives almost 
no deference to the interests the State asserted in support of the existing 
marriage law.169 Indeed, the opinion approvingly cites the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Romer v. Evans to support its conclusion that the 
current marriage law “confers an official stamp of approval on the 
destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable 
and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of 
respect.”170 
To the court, civil marriage is an evolving paradigm.”171 The court 
does note four purposes of marriage laws: (1) encouraging stable 
relationships over transient ones, (2) providing for orderly property 
distribution, (3) decreasing the state’s obligation to provide for the 
needy, and (4) providing a way to track important epidemiological and 
demographic data.”172 In contrast, the court assessed the interests 
asserted by the State in favor of its marriage law: (1) “providing a 
‘favorable setting for procreation;’” (2) increasing the number of 
children who are raised by a mother and father, the optimal setting for 
child rearing; and (3) preserving state resources.173 The court rejects the 
first because some married couples cannot or do not have children and 
some same-sex couples do.174 It rejects the second because the state 
already recognizes same-sex couple headed households and because it 
believes that the children raised in these households would be benefited 
if the couple were receiving marital benefits.175 It rejects the third interest 
because same-sex couples are as deserving of state benefits as others and 
marriage doesn’t require dependency between spouses.176 To this court, 
marriage seems to be just one of the many arrows in the quiver of public 
welfare providers. 
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In its decision, the court specifically notes its rejection of “centuries” 
of tradition but suggests that doing so will not harm the value of 
marriage.177 Rather, the court believes that “extending civil marriage to 
same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals 
and communities.”178 The court says that “[t]he marriage ban works a 
deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the community for 
no rational reason.”179 This, to the court, “suggests that the marriage 
restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or 
who are believed to be) homosexual.”180 
In its conclusion, the court followed the recent example of the 
Ontario Court of Appeals, calling their redefinition of marriage a 
“refine[ment of] the common law.”181 Specifically, the court provided a 
new official legal definition of marriage in Massachusetts: “the voluntary 
union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”182 
Having found marriage unconstitutional, the court stayed the effect of its 
ruling 180 days in which the legislature could “take such action as it may 
deem appropriate in light of this opinion.”183 
One of the justices, Justice Greaney, in the majority wrote a separate 
opinion arguing that the court decided correctly but should have held that 
marriage was a form of sex discrimination.184 Justice Greaney’s opinion 
included a somewhat condescending note to those who disagree: “Simple 
principles of decency dictate that we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their 
new status, full acceptance, tolerance and respect. We should do so 
because it is the right thing to do.”185 
There were also three dissenting opinions. Justice Spina would have 
held that the definition of marriage is a matter for the legislature to 
decide.186 He argued that neither sex is disadvantaged by the marriage 
law so it is not a form of sex discrimination and that the law does not 
take into account a person’s subjective sexual orientation.187 He rejected 
the anti-miscegenation analogy arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
invalidated such laws not as a way of protecting personal choice but of 
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defeating invalid racial distinctions.188 He notes that the majority opinion 
has redefined marriage and that the court’s definition is not, as traditional 
constitutional analysis requires, deeply rooted in our country’s history 
and tradition.189 
In her dissent, Justice Sosman argued that the court was not really 
using the rational basis test of constitutionality despite it claim to the 
contrary.190 Instead the court has assessed the marriage law under higher 
levels of scrutiny without admitting it.191 She also noted that many 
people raise children outside of marriage without any claim that they 
ought to be given the benefits of marriage.192 She said that it is not for the 
court to weigh the evidence of the best environment for children, rather 
that is a legislative function.193 She accused the court of allowing the 
emotional nature of the plaintiffs’ claim to distract it from the traditional 
deference it should give a claim lacking any supporting evidence.194 
Justice Cordy offered the final dissenting opinion. He also would 
have deferred to the legislature.195 Specifically, he pointed out the court’s 
implicit assumption that marriage is a unisex institution despite the fact 
that all previous right to marry cases had accepted the intrinsic nature of 
marriage as a social institution bringing the sexes together.196 He strongly 
criticized the majority’s constitutional analysis (the right of privacy can’t 
mean the right to state endorsement, same-sex marriage is not rooted in 
our country’s history and tradition, etc.).197 Justice Cordy also argued 
that the state interests in marriage are not irrational, noting that marriage 
has always been understood as the appropriate context for procreation 
and child rearing because sexual intercourse between men and women 
can result in conception (unlike other sexual relationships).198 He noted 
that marriage has successfully advanced this interest throughout time and 
that the relevant social science research comparing children raised by 
same-sex couples is small, methodologically flawed, and tentative.199 
Thus, the state could rationally decide that it is not ready to redefine 
marriage.200 He argued that adoption does not defeat the state’s interest 
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because a child available to be adopted has already lost the optimal 
family setting.201 He also rejected the court’s contention that the state’s 
refusal to ban certain types of family forms means that it cannot favor 
one type.202 He wrote that if marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples, 
marriage can continue to offer the message that procreation should take 
place in marriage.203 
IV.  CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 
The marriage litigation is by no means over yet. Three prominent 
cases challenging state marriage laws are pending currently and related 
controversies may provide for future litigation. 
A.  Indiana 
In August 2002, three same-sex couples represented by the Indiana 
Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit in the Marion County Superior 
Court seeking to compel the county clerk to issue them marriage 
licenses.204 The couples’ complaint also noted that each of the parties had 
contracted a Vermont civil union and included a plea that those unions be 
recognized if marriage licenses were not issued.205 The State filed a 
motion to dismiss and oral arguments were held March 30, 2003.206 
On May 7, 2003, Judge S.K. Reid granted the State’s motion.207 The 
court held that the Indiana Constitution does not provide a right to marry 
a person of one’s choice and that the federal right to marry also does not 
extend that far.208 The decision distinguished anti-miscegenation laws as 
imposing an extrinsic requirement to marriage in contrast to sex 
distinctions which are intrinsic to the nature of marriage.209 The court 
found that the marriage statute easily survives rational basis scrutiny 
because it furthers three state interests.210 The first State interest is 
encouraging procreation where both biological parents are present to 
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raise children.211 Same-sex couples, by contrast, cannot reproduce.212 The 
second interest identified by the court was the promotion of the 
traditional family as the basic unit of society.213 The final interest was the 
protection of the integrity of marriage since the theories underlying 
same-sex marriage could apply to other situations.214 For these same 
reasons, the court held that the marriage statute does not constitute a due 
process violation.215 In regards to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims, 
the court held that the State’s marriage statute was neutral in regards to 
the sex of the parties and that the intrinsic difference between same- and 
opposite-sex couples justifies any differences in legal treatment.216 An 
appeal of that decision is currently pending. 
B.  New Jersey 
While the Massachusetts case was pending, Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund recruited seven same-sex couples to challenge New 
Jersey’s marriage law.217 That case is pending at the trial court level. 
C.  Nebraska 
Just less than a year after the New Jersey case was filed, an unusual 
case was filed in federal district court in Nebraska. Brought by an 
advocacy group and five couples represented by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, it was a facial challenge to a provision of the Nebraska 
Constitution, Section 29, enacted in 2000, which provided that the State 
would not recognize same-sex marriages or similar statuses.218 The 
plaintiffs were quick to note they were not seeking marriage licenses, 
though.219 The State moved to dismiss the case on standing grounds and 
that motion is pending.220 
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D.  Hybrid Claims 
At the same time as these cases have challenged the legal view of 
marriage, two important lines of cases with implications for the issue of 
redefining marriage have been going on. In the first, plaintiffs seek to 
gain the benefits associated with marriage without specifically seeking 
marriage licenses.221 The underpinning of the claim is the use of 
“disparate impact” analysis, disavowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases, to show that since same-sex couples are 
disproportionately denied the benefits of marriage, laws which provide 
for tangible benefits based on marital status are a type of “sexual 
orientation” discrimination.222 The first case in which this idea was 
adopted came out of litigation in which same-sex couples, one of whom 
was employed by Oregon Health Sciences University, challenged the 
provision of employment benefits only to spouses of employees.223 The 
court of appeals held that there was no valid justification for the denial of 
benefits, and thus, that the policy was discriminatory.224 A New York 
Court of Appeals decision involving a same-sex couple seeking to live in 
married student housing at a private university was remanded to the trial 
court to give the plaintiffs a chance to “establish that [the university’s] 
policy regarding university-owned housing with non-students 
disproportionately burdens lesbians and gay men.”225 If they establish 
this, the university would have to show (as the New York City Code 
requires) that the policy bears a “significant relationship to a significant 
business objective.”226 Cases making similar claims have been rejected at 
the trial court levels in Alaska227 and Montana228 and are pending on 
appeal. 
The second line of cases arises out of the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
mandate of civil union benefits. In these cases, plaintiffs seek to gain 
some recognition in other states of civil unions they contracted in 
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Vermont. In the first, a woman who had been found in contempt of court 
for violating a custody agreement with her ex-husband by allowing her 
same-sex partner to stay with her overnight while her children were 
visiting, asserted that her civil union contracted with the partner in 
Vermont should be recognized as a marriage in Georgia for purposes of 
the custody agreement.229 The court of appeals rejected the claim holding 
that the civil union was not a marriage and that even if the couple had 
been able to enter a same-sex marriage, it would not be recognized as 
legally valid in Georgia given the Georgia state marriage recognition 
law, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, and the fact that the definition 
of marriage is a question to be left to the legislature rather than the 
judiciary.230 
In Connecticut, one partner in a Vermont civil union attempted to get 
a Connecticut court to dissolve the union.231 The court held that the union 
was not a marriage and thus could not be dissolved by a Connecticut 
court.232 In a similar case, a Texas couple who had contracted a civil 
union sought a divorce in Beaumont County, Texas.233 The judge had 
initially granted the divorce, but rescinded that order after the state 
attorney general intervened in the case, at which point the petition was 
withdrawn.234 
One case of this type has been successful, though. It involved a claim 
for wrongful death of a partner in a civil union, and the trial court held 
that the plaintiff’s civil union should be treated as a marriage in the 
narrow context of a wrongful death action.235 
V. OBSERVATIONS ON THREE DECADES OF LITIGATION 
At least four trends have contributed to the acceptance of claims for 
redefining marriage, and have in turn been driven by the increasing 
acceptance of these claims. 
A.  Strategy 
The first trend is the increasing sophistication of the lawsuits being 
brought to gain the redefinition of marriage. All of the early cases (until 
the Hawaii litigation) involved only one couple, though often, as has 
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been noted above, the plaintiffs saw their lawsuit as part of a broader 
radical agenda. It also does not appear that the forums were chosen for 
any particular reason or that serious public relations efforts were 
employed. 
Professor Patricia Cain suggests that in the 1970s, gay rights 
organizations made a conscious choice to pursue a litigation strategy, 
partly because “lobbying for legislative change could not be supported 
by tax-deductible contributions, but that litigating for judicial change 
could be.”236 Still, marriage did not seem to be on the litigation agenda in 
a serious way until the 1990s. The shift in strategy is illustrated by the 
Hawaii litigation which involved three couples chosen by an activist. 
Similarly, the Vermont case involved three couples, some in long-term 
relationships, and with a mix of men and women. As Professor Greg 
Johnson notes, “one thing that distinguishes Vermont is the remarkable 
amount of planning and coordination which preceded and accompanied 
the push for equal marriage rights.”237 
Along these same lines, the cases that have been initiated since the 
1990s have tended to involve large national or regional organizations 
with significant litigation experience. Although the American Civil 
Liberties Union affiliate initially chose not to participate in the Hawaii 
suit, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund joined the case after 
the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision and Evan Wolfson, director of 
Lambda’s Marriage Project, became co-counsel.238 Mary Bonauto of 
New England’s Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders served as co-
counsel in the Vermont and Massachusetts cases.239 The American Civil 
Liberties Union and its affiliates have been involved in the Indiana and 
Nebraska lawsuits as well as all of the suits seeking marital benefits for 
same sex couples.240 Professor Cain has also noted that these national 
groups have increasingly been able to coordinate their litigation 
projects.241 
The importance of these groups in the marriage litigation cannot be 
understated. They command significant resources. In 1994, the Lesbian 
and Gay Rights Project at the ACLU had a budget of nearly $1 million 
and “participate[d] in more lesbian and gay rights litigation than any 
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other organization in the country.”242 The annual budget of the ACLU 
today is about $50 million.243 In 2002, Lambda received a grant of 
$130,000 from the Gill Foundation244 and $300,000 from the Ford 
Foundation.245 Lambda Legal’s website notes 110 employers who match 
employee contributions to the Fund.246 The home page also notes the 
sponsorship of such corporations as United Airlines, LexisNexis and 
others.247 Lambda’s budget for fiscal year 2002 indicates $5,680,400 for 
legal and education efforts, grants of $1,448,372 from foundations, and 
$3,936,847 from individuals.248 
These organizations also benefit from significant cooperation from 
outside attorneys and law firms.249 Lambda lists financial contributions 
from ninety-three law firms.250 It also notes pro bono support from thirty-
three attorneys or law firms and boasts a cooperating attorney network.251 
B.  Cultural Changes 
Obviously though, strategic thinking and plentiful resources alone do 
not deliver legal victories. Clear cultural shifts have also been at work. 
While it is obviously beyond the scope of this article to outline all of the 
changes in public opinion related to sexual behavior, a brief mention of 
three general legal trends will at least hint at some of the shifts that may 
have made the effort to redefine marriage seem more reasonable to the 
courts addressing the issue. 
In his significant article on the transformation of family law, 
Professor Carl Schneider quotes Max Weber as follows: 
All systems of ethics, no matter what the substantive content, can be 
divided into two main groups. There is the “heroic” ethic, which 
imposes on men demands of principle to which they are generally not 
 
 242. Id. at 69. 
 243. $8 Million Gift Will Boost ACLU Campaign to Fight Bush Administration’s Assault on 
Civil Liberties, ACLU press release Jan. 15, 2003, at http://www.aclu.org/news. 
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Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) Movement, HIV/AIDS Programming, ASCRIBE NEWS, Apr. 18, 2002. 
 245. Ford Foundation, Grants Database at http://www.fordfound.org/grants_db/ 
view_grant_detail1.cfm (last visited May 1, 2004). 
 246. Lambda Legal, Matching Gifts at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/join/gifts. 
 247. See http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited May 6, 2004). 
 248. Making It Happen: Lambda Legal Annual Report 2002 at 54-55 (May 28, 2003) at 
www.lambdalegal.org/binary_data/LAMBA_PDF/pdf/221.pdf (on file with the BYU Journal of 
Public Law). 
 249. See Federalist Society, Pro Bono Activities at the AMLaw 100, ABA WATCH, Feb. 2001. 
 250. Making It Happen: Lambda Legal Annual Report 2002 at 58-69 (May 28, 2003) at 
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able to do justice, except at the high points of their lives, but which 
serve as signposts pointing the way for man’s endless striving. Or there 
is the “ethic of the mean,” which is content to accept man’s everyday 
“nature” as setting a maximum for the demands which can be made.252 
Professor Schneider notes that there has been an associated change in the 
nature of moral discourse: namely, a change away from aspirational 
morality.”253 He contrasts nineteenth century family law which “set a 
standard of behavior not readily attainable” of “an ideal of lifelong 
marital fidelity and responsibility” with modern family law which “not 
only rejects some of the old standards as meaningless, undesirable, or 
wrong,” but “also hesitates to set standards that cannot readily be 
enforced or that go beyond the minimal responsibility expressed in the 
can phrase, ‘do your own thing, as long as you don’t hurt anybody 
else.’”254 Perhaps the best practical illustration of this shift has been the 
successful effort to remove fault grounds from the law of divorce (either 
completely or by coupling them with no-fault grounds).255 Similarly, 
advocacy for redefining marriage often includes a variation of the theme, 
“the law should reflect the reality of how people are living.”256 The 
reality of same-sex couples raising children was important to the 
Vermont Supreme Court in its decision.257 Conversely, the aspirational 
argument that children deserve the ideal setting for childrearing (a 
mother and father) did not fare well in the Hawaii trial court.258 
Accompanying a decline in the favor shown to normative judgments 
in family law has been a decline in the “family’s institutional 
strength.”259 As Professor Bruce Hafen has noted, “family law now 
reflects less confidence in the value of marriage- and kinship-based 
models of family form.”260 The growing legal acceptance of nonmarital 
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 257. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884-85 (Vt. 1999). 
 258. Baehr v. Miike, Docket No. 91-1394 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
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cohabitation is an illustration of this crisis of confidence.261 With 
expanding recognition of a variety of new “family” configurations, the 
law seems to increasingly accept a “functional” definition of the family 
in which a family is identified not by what it is, but by what it does.262 
This, in turn, makes courts more receptive to the argument that the law 
needs to reflect the reality of same-sex couple relationships. Thus, the 
Vermont Supreme Court held that “the essential aspect of [the plaintiffs’] 
claim is simply and fundamentally for inclusion in the family of state-
sanctioned human relations.”263 
Finally, family law increasingly seems to be willing to see marriage 
and the family in contractual terms based on a primacy of the individual 
interests of the parties involved rather than the intrinsic value of the 
status of marriage or family.264 Nowhere is the implication of this trend 
for the debate over redefining marriage more evident than in the recent 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals which characterized marriage 
as “without dispute, one of the most significant forms of personal 
relationships.”265 In fact, the decision in the Alaska marriage case 
included the judge’s holding that marriage needed to be redefined to 
comport with a “freedom to choose one’s life partner.”266 In a similar 
vein, the Vermont decision stated, “[i]n short, the marriage laws 
transform a private agreement into a source of significant public benefits 
and protections.”267 The Hawaii court described marriage in explicitly 
contractual terms as “a partnership to which both parties bring their 
financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”268 
C.  State Constitutionalism Movement 
As noted above, one factor in the success of recent marriage cases 
has been the selection of forums thought to be receptive to the claims of 
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plaintiffs. On a practical level, this has involved the selection of states 
that are seen as likely to be receptive to the claims.269 
The attractiveness of these forums, though, has its root in a more 
fundamental development in legal theory: the movement to extract from 
state constitutions more expansive rights than the United States Supreme 
Court has been willing to find in the U.S. Constitution.270 The movement 
began in the 1970s when Chief Justice Earl Warren was replaced on the 
U.S. Supreme Court by Chief Justice Warren Burger and largely 
championed by Justice William Brennan who encouraged state courts to 
be proactive in finding new constitutional rights in state constitutions 
rather than accepting the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.271 Though styled as a “revival” of past state court 
activism, “[w]hen state judges turned to their state declarations of rights 
in the early 1970s, they were not recovering a tradition but creating 
one.”272 
Professor Cain notes that the turn to state courts and state 
constitutional claims has been particularly helpful “in the case of lesbian 
and gay rights.”273 This assertion seems to be validated by the success of 
the marriage litigation in Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont when compared 
to the only federal decisions on the question.274 A number of state courts 
had invalidated sodomy laws even before the U.S. Supreme Court did, as 
in the instance of Georgia, with particularly unsympathetic fact 
scenarios.275 The state-claims-only strategy also has the benefit of not 
provoking federal precedent contradicting a court decision redefining 
marriage. This reflects a reasonable political calculation that it would be 
easier to convince a state court in a “progressive” jurisdiction to accept a 
“right to same-sex marriage” than the more staid U.S. Supreme Court. 
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D.  Elite Legal Opinion 
Perhaps the most important reason for the recent successes of the 
movement to redefine marriage lies in its most basic characteristic: that it 
has been pursued in the courts rather than through the legislative process. 
Since 1995, thirty-seven states have enacted legislation that provides that 
only marriages between a man and a woman will be recognized in that 
state.276 Three states have constitutional amendments defining marriage 
as the union of a man and a woman and one has an amendment allowing 
the legislature to define marriage in that way.277 In 1996, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act defining marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman for federal purposes and providing that 
states cannot be forced under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other 
states.278 
In his article on the decline of moral discourse in family law, 
Professor Carl Schneider hypothesized, 
that the trend toward diminished moral discourse is most actively 
promoted by lawyers, judges and legal scholars who are, relative to the 
state legislators and judges who would otherwise decide family law 
questions, affluent, educated and elite. This group’s views on family 
law questions are (relatively) liberal, secular, modern, and 
noninterventionist.279 
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There is significant evidence that this hypothesis is applicable to the 
same-sex marriage context and that legal elites, particularly judges and 
academics, are much more sympathetic to the effort to redefine marriage 
than are the legislators and the general public. 
There seems little question that legal elites are more accepting of the 
claims for legal recognition of homosexual persons and same-sex 
relationships.280 After the Lawrence decision,281 a news report quoted 
Mark Tushnet, president of the Association of American Law Schools, as 
saying that “clearly, the legal profession and the law professoriate is 
strongly in favor” of “gay rights” although he did not see any 
discrepancy between the view of the legal elite and the general public.282 
Contrary to Professor Tushnet’s assertion, the massive divide between 
the way judges and legislators, respectively, have responded to the idea 
of redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, indicates a 
significant divergence between elite legal opinion and public opinion. 
This is underscored by the success of ballot initiatives like those 
approving the state constitutional amendments noted above. Another 
commentator explained the willingness of U.S. Supreme Court justices to 
“follow elite opinion, even when it diverges from public opinion” as 
“only human” because “[t]he justices’ closest professional collaborators 
are their extremely bright young law clerks, fresh out of elite law schools 
where liberalism reigns supreme and the views of ordinary Americans 
are widely scorned.”283 He notes that the Justices’ “reputations are 
shaped by predominantly liberal news media, law professors, lawyers’ 
groups such as the American Bar Association, women’s groups . . . and 
other civil-rights groups.”284 Interestingly, Human Rights Magazine, the 
organ of the ABA’s Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, 
recently published an issue about same-sex couples including only 
articles favoring greater legal recognition of same-sex relationships, 
including a call for the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act from a 
sitting federal judge.285 There is also research which indicates that while 
college graduates may be more “liberal” on the question of identifying 
homosexuals as a discrete class for purposes of discrimination laws than 
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the general public, law students are “slightly more liberal on this social 
issue than are college graduates as a whole.”286 This same survey 
indicated that law students “were slightly more supportive of gay rights” 
after attending law school.287 This was one of only two areas where 
changes in attitudes were noted as a result of the law school 
experience.288 
To this general favor shown by judges to elite opinion is added the 
increasing willingness of judges to actively decide social issues once 
thought to be the province of legislators. As Professor Ted Morton 
observed in the context of the Ontario decision, “[i]ntoxicated by the 
power and status of their new self-made roles as Platonic philosopher-
kings and social reformers, our judicial elites have abandoned any 
pretense of neutrality between competing social interests in Canadian 
society.”289 Similarly, Professor Harvey Mansfield, Jr. notes that “[e]ager 
judges, unconscious of their own ambition and reckless of the 
consequences, encouraged resort to the courts and have brought us close 
to a condition in which a citizen is someone who sues.”290 Again, the 
dearth of legislative action aimed at redefining marriage, compared to the 
lawsuits attempting to accomplish the same result, is instructive. 
Maybe the most important explanation of the sympathy for the idea 
of redefining marriage among judges lies in the judicial habit of mind. In 
his masterful article on constitutional interpretation, Professor Robert 
Nagel identified the inquiry of much modern constitutional doctrine as 
“rationalism” as defined by philosopher Michael Oakeshott.291 He notes 
that “the rationalist prefers knowledge that is ‘susceptible of 
formulations in rules, principles, directions, maxims: comprehensively, 
in propositions.’”292 Professor Nagel argues that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“[i]n its drive to find ever more expansive values in the Constitution” has 
been “deeply enmeshed in a general intellectual fashion.”293 He explains 
the fondness for abstraction by noting that, “[i]f a value is sufficiently 
abstract it will necessarily seem to have broad relevance to human 
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affairs, important or petty.”294 The abstraction favored by the advocates 
of redefining marriage and accepted by the courts where they have been 
successful, is the abstract concept of equality. The Hawaii decision 
invoked equality between the sexes in its opinion. 295 That same idea was 
accepted without question in the Alaska decision. 296 The three opinions 
in the Vermont case all agreed on one point: that equality demanded 
legal recognition of same-sex couples. 297 The majority invoked the Equal 
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, 298 Justice Dooley favored a 
measure of equality based on sexual orientation, 299 and Justice Johnson 
would have followed the Hawaii logic. 300 The majority opinion in the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision indiscriminately mixed 
equality and liberty arguments to reach its decision301 and the 
concurrence would have followed the sex discrimination route.302 
The problem, however, with the rationalist approach is incisively 
noted by Professor Nagel. It is that “[t]reating social choices as a series 
of intellectual problems is reassuring to many in the educated classes, but 
it also tends to denigrate important values and to stunt moral and political 
discourse.”303 He notes later that “to the extent that constitutional 
rationalism forces communities to explain their decisions in terms of 
relatively remote relationships between policies and objectives, absurd 
purposes are postulated and important values are unfairly trivialized.”304 
To return to the previous discussion of cultural changes, Professor Nagel 
points out that the “demand for empirical validation . . . skews dialogue 
away from aspiration.”305 In a recent book describing “gay rights” cases 
litigated before the U.S. Supreme Court, the authors describe Justice 
Lewis Powell’s discomfort with an analogy between Court precedent 
regarding the “sanctity of the home” and sodomy raised in oral argument 
in the Bowers case.306 Like the difficulty in describing the taste of salt,307 
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Justice Powell initially seemed to sense the incompatibility of a right to 
nonmarital sexual behavior with the traditional values associated with 
home and family. In the rationalist account, such a sense would carry 
little or no weight.308 
One of the most obvious targets of this judicial frame of mind is 
tradition. Professor Nagel argues that “the courts often operate under the 
assumption that beliefs which originate in tradition (and thus have the 
advantage, at least, of being time-tested) are impermissible bases for 
public policy, unless they can be justified by some rational standard 
extrinsic to the tradition.”309 While some customs and traditions are 
clearly not necessary, “to envision the Constitution as requiring a 
presumptive hostility to the past creates the danger that courts will 
prevent people from building a coherent knowledge and sense of 
morality.”310 The court thus ensures that the laws that most intimately 
affect the core social institutions of communities become the domain of 
experts only. There is no place for the moral intuition of the mass of 
citizens who may lack the empirical tools to sway courts, but who could 
move majorities of their fellow citizens to enact legislation. Thus, 
“[h]abitual denigration of traditional values carries the risk that certain 
groups will come to see the Constitution as an alien document, used by 
segments of the educated classes to belittle and undermine their way of 
life.”311 
The irony, as noted by Professor Hadley Arkes is that “judges and 
political men are never more rigid and moralistic in their teaching as 
when they are ridiculing moral judgment and professing to free people 
from the tyranny of moral truths.”312 Thus, the equality or civil rights 
paradigm begins to mow down everything in its path: tradition, marriage, 
self-government, etc. Or, to use another analogy, the equality paradigm, 
with which courts seem to view marriage, works as a procrustean bed: 
what the courts see as extrinsic, like the unique contributions of each sex 
to marriage, must be lopped off. Given all this, it is interesting to note 
that the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment pending in the U.S. 
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House of Representatives is explicitly aimed at curbing judicial 
incursions into the realm of marital benefits.313 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
With all that has happened, we are still left with some very important 
unanswered questions. Specifically, (1) what does the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent decision invalidating Texas’ sodomy law mean for this 
debate? (2) what are the likely future legal claims? and (3) what will 
happen to marriage if it is redefined? 
A.  Impact of Lawrence v. Texas 
When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’ law prohibiting 
sodomy between same-sex couples314 and overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick,315 the national conversation seemed to turn reflexively to the 
implications for the definition of marriage.316 It would be tempting to say 
that Lawrence will have no effect on the debate over redefining marriage. 
The majority opinion notes that its holding “does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”317 More directly, Justice O’Connor, 
in her concurrence, says that “other reasons exist to promote the 
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group” and characterizes “preserving the traditional interest of marriage” 
as a “legitimate state interest.”318 Unfortunately, Justice O’Connor did 
not specify the reasons that would justify the current legal definition of 
marriage. It is also not clear how this statement squares with her earlier 
assertion that “[w]e have been most likely to apply rational basis review 
to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, 
as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”319 Of 
course, Justice Scalia’s dissent undercuts any possibility of consensus on 
this point. He accuses the majority of making “no effort to cabin the 
scope of its decision to exclude” same-sex marriage and in reference to 
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the disclaimers by the majority and Justice O’Connor regarding marriage 
laws, says, “[d]o not believe it.”320 
There are two possible ways in which the Lawrence decision may 
have an influence on the debate over redefining marriage. First it may 
contribute to the acceleration of the cultural trends discussed above.321 
Twenty years ago, Professor Hafen noted that “a right of sexual freedom 
cannot reasonably be inferred from the procreative rights recognized by 
the Court, nor has the Court developed a general right of personal 
privacy or autonomy broad enough to include sex outside marriage.”322 
In contrast, the Lawrence decision marks the first time the Supreme 
Court has recognized sexual rights unrelated to marriage or kinship. Such 
a development seems very likely to contribute to an increase in the value 
the law attributes to individualism while further decreasing the law’s 
endorsement of normative ideals. 
The second possible influence is that Lawrence may signal the 
Court’s willingness to make decisions without constitutional justification 
even if it means discarding precedent. Whatever the virtue of Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence as prophecy regarding the marriage 
situation, he certainly is correct in identifying (1) the lack of rationale for 
the Court’s invocation of floating levels of abstraction in identifying 
rights and (2) the lack of consistency in the application of its doctrines.323 
For instance, at one point, the Court seems very close to endorsing John 
Stuart Mill’s “harm principle.”324 At other times, the decision’s 
description of the interests involved is almost metaphysical.325 In 
addition, at no point, does the Court use the language of “fundamental 
rights” although that seems to be implied. The Court avoids any 
discussion of equal protection analysis, hinting only that the reasoning of 
Romer v. Evans326 (which is inexplicably called “a case of principal 
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relevance” though it is expressly not applied), provides a “tenable 
argument” for striking down the law at issue.327 More significantly, the 
Court twice makes reference to changing attitudes over time.328 Consider 
also the Court’s reference to “values we share with a wider civilization” 
and citation to foreign authority,329 though the Court leaves completely 
unclear the contours of this source of authority.330 In the absence of some 
limiting factors, it would seem to be entirely at the Justice’s discretion to 
determine relevant foreign law. These portions of the decision can hardly 
encourage those who would like to believe that the Lawrence decision 
signals an unwillingness to resolve the marriage issue. 
If this reading of the Lawrence opinion is correct, it would seem to 
vindicate the charge, discussed above, that legal elites are becoming 
more hostile to normative understandings of the family and increasingly 
capable of comprehending the justifications supporting these 
understandings. An example might be the Court’s account of the history 
of sodomy laws. The Court takes a novel view of the historical record to 
characterize the laws as recently taking on an “anti-homosexual” 
meaning.331 While the Court is correct to note that sodomy laws did not 
apply solely to same-sex couples until the 1970s, it is interesting that the 
Court did not consider the fact that their own marital privacy case law 
might have had something to do with that.332 The Court also did not even 
mention the possibility that these kinds of laws might have less to do 
with a heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy than with a marital/non-
marital dichotomy. To confuse things even more, though, the Court 
expressly avoided equal protection rationale for its decision in order to 
avoid some who “might question whether a prohibition would be valid if 
drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct between same-sex and 
different-sex participants.”333 
B.  Future Legal Claims 
The next unanswered question is, what does the future hold in terms 
of marriage litigation? Predictions are inherently provisional, but one 
thing seems certain: the effort to secure a redefinition of marriage to 
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include same-sex couples through litigation will not end anytime soon, at 
the least because advocates have not run out of “progressive” 
jurisdictions in which to ply their claims. Any hope that a “compromise” 
such as civil unions would be seen as sufficient should have been 
dispelled when, following the Vermont decision, a series of new 
marriage suits were filed, both strategic (Massachusetts and New Jersey) 
and spontaneous (Arizona).334 
As has been demonstrated with the Vermont civil union status, once 
one state provides for same-sex marriage, it is almost assured that 
couples from other jurisdictions will marry in that state and return home 
to seek recognition either as a married couple or for some discrete 
marital benefits.335 This will require challenging their own state’s 
marriage law and in the thirty-seven states noted above, the laws that 
prohibit the recognition of such a marriage.336 Couples in Alaska, Hawaii 
and Nevada will have to pursue litigation similar to Nebraska’s in federal 
court to overcome the constitutional prohibitions in those states. A 
challenge to a state’s marriage recognition policy may also involve a 
challenge to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act. 
In response to these possible scenarios, the proposed Federal 
Marriage Amendment aims to end this kind of litigation.337 Of course, it 
may engender legal challenges of its own.338 
C.  Future of Marriage 
Perhaps the most important question, of course, is what a redefinition 
of marriage would do to marriage itself. Advocates of the change ridicule 
the idea that marriage will be harmed by redefining it.339 They 
sarcastically ask who is going to leave their marriage if same-sex couples 
are allowed to marry. 
The danger, though, is not primarily in luring people out of their 
marriages but in what same-sex marriage would do to marriage as a 
social institution. As Maggie Gallagher has observed, 
Normal marriage is normative. Marriage does not merely reflect 
individual desire, it shapes and channels it. Marriage as a social 
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institution communicates that a certain kind of sexual union is, in fact, 
our shared ideal: one where a man and a woman join not only their 
bodies, but also their hearts and their bank accounts, in a context where 
children are welcome. Of course not everybody wants or achieves this 
social ideal. In important ways marriage regulates the relationships and 
sexual conduct even of people who are not married and may never 
marry. Its social and legal prominence informs young lovers of the end 
towards which they aspire, the outward meaning of their most urgent, 
personal impulses. Its existence signals to cohabitors the limitations of 
their own, as well as their partners’, commitment.340 
In order for a social institution to have any expectation of fulfilling 
these channeling and signaling functions, it must have some meaning. As 
Professor Hafen suggests, “the contribution of family life to the 
conditions that develop and sustain long-term personal fulfillment and 
autonomy depends (among many other important factors) upon 
maintaining the family as a legally defined and structurally significant 
entity.”341 The strength of marriage as a social institution can be lost “if 
the family is simply ‘a collection of individuals united temporarily for 
their mutual convenience and armed with rights against each other.’”342 
As Professor Dan Cere has argued, “[i]nstitutions like marriage are about 
socially embodied meanings and practices, they are not just legal buckets 
that you can fill as you like.”343 
As a constitutional matter, if the right to marry becomes the right to a 
marriage of one’s choosing, hasn’t the substance of that right actually 
been eaten up? The right to a marriage of one’s choice is just a subset of 
a right to radical personal autonomy. 
This, then, is the risk of redefining marriage: the potential “collapse 
of [marriage’s] social meaning.”344 The social meaning of marriage is not 
arbitrary: 
The law does not impose a pattern by strong norms of social 
engineering; it protects and reinforces the boundaries of a naturally 
recurring social institution with social norms that arise out of the need 
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to reconcile the differing sexuality of men and women and the personal 
and social consequences thereof.345 
Contrast this with the common argument in favor of redefining 
marriage: that marriage would help tame some of the promiscuity 
inherent in male same-sex sexual relationships.346 As one recent 
commentator has noted, this “argument is a pure piece of social 
engineering advocacy.”347 It assumes there is no difference between men 
and women and that marriage has a social role quite apart from its 
joining of men and women. However, as Maggie Gallagher has written, 
“[m]en and women are not interchangeable units, sex has a meaning 
beyond immediate pleasure, society needs babies, children need mothers 
and fathers, marriage is a word for the way we join men and women to 
make the future happen.”348 The U.S. Supreme Court has also noted the 
inherent difference between mixed sex communities and single sex 
communities.349 
The really startling practical innovation same-sex marriage has 
introduced is the endorsement of radically fatherless or motherless 
homes. Clearly, there is a surfeit of such homes now, but the novelty is in 
the significant change of removing any sense of concern for these kinds 
of situations, because same-sex couple homes will be motherless or 
fatherless by choice. While single people do have children with no 
intention of marrying, there remains the possibility that they will later 
marry or at least have a relationship with the child’s father or mother. In 
a same-sex couple headed family, what would the roles of father and 
mother even mean? 
Whatever the variations in practice, the ideal of marriage is 
inextricably linked to the reality that men and women become mothers 
and fathers as a natural result of their relationship. Thus, they are 
encouraged to commit to one another in a binding relationship for the 
sake of those children and to further society’s interest in ensuring that 
those children are provided for. Recognizing and, indeed privileging, 
marriage is the law’s way of channeling individuals into this 
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relationship.350 Without this message, marriage seems less like a social 
institution than a term of convenience for intimate adult relationships. If 
the law’s channeling function is impaired, other institutions may be 
called on to provide that function, but without the resources, authority 
and common currency inherent in legal norms, these institutions will be 
significantly less effective in channeling individuals toward, and 
channeling behavior within, marriage. At best, they can provide the 
function only for their own members. 
Already, the litigation to redefine marriage is producing a bankrupt 
account of marriage’s meaning. The best example comes from the 
Ontario Court of Appeals decision: 
Marriage is, without dispute, one of the most significant forms of 
personal relationships. . . . Through the institution of marriage, 
individuals can publicly express their love and commitment to each 
other. Through this institution, society publicly recognizes expressions 
of love and commitment between individuals, granting them respect 
and legitimacy as a couple. This public recognition and sanction of 
marital relationships reflect society’s approbation of the personal 
hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal 
relationships. This can only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth 
and dignity.351 
Other examples from the United States have already been noted.352 
The so-called “sexual revolution” of the 1960s helped to speed the 
decline in the strength of marriage as a social institution by removing the 
stigma from many alternative arrangements. Though this may have 
precipitated a rise in non-marital cohabitation,353 the ideal of marriage 
has been surprisingly resilient. To extend the revolution analogy, the 
redefinition of marriage would be the Great Leap Forward,354 purging the 
last remnants of social meaning and connection to children from 
marriage.355 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of an individual’s opinion on the substantive issues raised 
by the effort to redefine marriage through litigation, it certainly is an 
interesting story so far. It is also not over by any means. The events of 
the next months and years will provide some clues as to what the future 
will hold and crucial questions about society’s most central institution 
will continue to be debated. Proponents will continue to assert that 
equality is being deprived and opponents will continue to assert that a 
radical change to the institution of marriage is fraught with danger. The 
continuing civil dialogue engaged in by those on either side will be of 
great value. 
As an opponent, I think the following comment by Maggie Gallagher 
in testimony before the Massachusetts Legislature provides some 
important perspective: 
Will gays and lesbians suffer if marriage remains an opposite-sex 
union? The Census Bureau indicates that about one-half of one percent 
of households now consist of same-sex partners. How many of these 
wish to marry is unknown. About half of all opposite-sex cohabiters 
marry. If the proportion of cohabiters that want marriage is the same 
among same-sex as among opposite-sex partners, the upper bound of 
the demand for marriage is one-quarter of one-percent of households. 
Meanwhile, forty percent of children go to sleep in fatherless 
households. The sexual liberty interests of adults in choosing their own 
family forms should not trump the interest of state and society in trying 
to strengthen marriage, and reverse trends towards family 
fragmentation.356 
In a previous article, I referenced a quote attributed to G.K. Chesterton: 
“Don’t ever take a fence down until you know the reason why it was put 
up.”357 In a time of family upheaval when many legal policymakers seem 
to have “lost the plot about family life”358 the danger is that judges will 
be tempted to remove a fence protecting marriage by discarding its social 
meaning in an effort at social engineering in the name of equality or 
autonomy. This would be a serious mistake. Better to invigorate the 
understanding of the social meaning of marriage. Maybe, ironically, this 
will be the ultimate outcome of the same-sex marriage litigation. 
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